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SCRUPULOUS IN APPLYING THE LAW:
JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG
AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT1
Sidney Harring*
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier**
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s appointment to the United
States Supreme Court in 1993 coincided with rising concerns about
the use of the death penalty in the United States. That same year
marked the publication of Sister Helen Prejean’s Dead Man Walk-
ing,2 which has been identified as the beginning of the Death Pen-
alty Moratorium Movement in the United States.3 During February
1994 of Justice Ginsburg’s first term, her colleague, Justice Harry
Blackmun, wrote a decision concluding that the death penalty was
unconstitutional.4  In the following years, new discoveries about in-
nocent defendants on death row and the adoption of death penalty
moratoriums put the spotlight on systemic problems with capital
punishment in the United States.5
As she took her seat on the Supreme Court bench, Justice
* Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. Ph.D., University of
Wisconsin, 1976; J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1972; M.S., University of Wisconsin,
1970; B.A., Macalester College, 1968.
** Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law. J.D., Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, 1989; B.A., Case Western Reserve University, 1984.
The authors thank Julie Graves, Carlos Medina, and Rita Verga for their research
assistance.
1 The title comes from a Justice Ginsburg quote. When asked during her confir-
mation hearings how she would decide capital cases, she said she would be “scrupu-
lous in applying law on the basis of legislation and precedent.” Mei-Fei Kuo & Kai
Wang, When is an Innovation in Order?: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stare Decisis, 20
U. HAW. L. REV. 835, 863 (1998) (quoting Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 103d Cong. 51, 53 (1993) (statement of Judge Ruth Bader
Gisnburg)).
2 HELEN PREJEAN, C.S.J., DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).
3 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death Penalty Moratorium
Movement in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 22-25 (2002) (discussing the signif-
icance of the publication of Sister Helen Prejean’s book) [hereinafter Kirchmeier,
Moratorium].
4 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from de-
nial of petition for writ of certiorari).
5 See Kirchmeier, Moratorium, supra note 3, at 39-43.
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Ginsburg had never before encountered the death penalty as a ju-
rist, nor had she faced the responsibility of condemning someone
to death or of deciding midnight requests for stays of execution.
Her only documented encounter with the death penalty came
when she co-authored an amicus brief in a capital case as a volun-
teer attorney for the ACLU while a law professor at Rutgers Law
School.6 One can only speculate about the impact of these respon-
sibilities on a new Supreme Court justice, especially one as com-
plex as Justice Ginsburg. While her experiences as an attorney
revealed her to be a defender of individual rights with a concern
for oppressed groups,7 her record as a judge on the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit disclosed her embrace of
judicial moderation.8
Justice Ginsburg has now been on the Supreme Court for
more than ten years. She has faced last-minute stay of execution
requests and has held the lives of the condemned in her hands.
She had these experiences while new concerns about the system
have been voiced in the courts and in society. Partly because of the
limited number of written opinions in capital cases authored by
Justice Ginsburg, the language in her opinions has not yet created
a clear picture of her views as a jurist on the ultimate punishment.
To a large extent, she has remained true to her approach to judg-
ing, as she explained at her confirmation hearings, to be “neither
liberal nor conservative.”9 She has also stayed true to her goal of
following the law, despite her concerns about the application of
6 Joyce Ann Baugh et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Preliminary Assessment, 26 U.
TOL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994).
7 Id. at 5.
By being female and having been the victim of gender discrimination,
Ginsburg should be very sensitive to the claims of the politically power-
less who may look to the courts for support. As the first Jewish justice
since Abe Fortas left the bench in the early 1970s, Ginsburg’s experi-
ence as a member of a religious minority might enhance this sensitivity.
Id. Also, her role as an attorney in cases advocating equal protection for women led
some commentators to refer to her as “the Thurgood Marshall of gender equality
law.” Id. at 4.
8 Id. at 7.
Because of her reputation for judicial moderation through her service
on the court of appeals, Ginsburg received endorsements not only from
Democrats, but also from key Republican senators, particularly Robert
Dole of Kansas, the Senate minority leader, and Orrin Hatch of Utah,
the GOP’s ranking member on the Judiciary Committee.
Id.
9 Id. (quoting Excerpts from Senate Hearings on the Ginsburg Nomination, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 1993, at C27).
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the death penalty and her personal support for a moratorium on
executions.10
Commentators have focused on other areas where Justice
Ginsburg’s written opinions have had a greater impact and which
reflect her specialties, including gender and equality issues.11 How-
ever, all Supreme Court justices play an active role in capital cases,
not only in the published opinions, but also in the day-to-day activi-
ties in dealing with requests for stays of execution and other mo-
tions. As a result, reflection on her limited published work in this
area provides insight into how she has dealt with this explosive area
of the law since first encountering the death penalty as a jurist a
decade ago.
This Article considers the record relating to the death penalty
that Justice Ginsburg has created thus far. Section II discusses her
appointment to the United States Supreme Court and the role that
the death penalty played in her confirmation process. Section III
addresses some of her votes and opinions upholding death
sentences. Section IV addresses her three majority opinions in capi-
tal cases to date. Section V discusses her votes and opinions against
the imposition of the death penalty. Then, considering the range
of her written opinions, this Article concludes that her views on the
death penalty are still developing, but the cases present a tempered
and thoughtful approach to genuine concerns about the fairness
of the death penalty system in the United States.
II. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S APPOINTMENT TO THE SUPREME COURT
Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a surprise appointment to the
United States Supreme Court in 1993, considering the checkered
context of President Clinton’s “moderate” jurisprudence.12 She,
along with Justice Stephen Breyer, have been described as moder-
ates and as “techno-judges,” highly qualified federal appellate
10 Anne Gearan, Ginsburg Backs Ending Death Penalty, AP Online, Apr. 10, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 18926396.
11 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsburg and the Judicial Role in Expanding
“We the People”: the Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 49 (2004); Deborah Jones
Merritt & David M. Lieberman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Jurisprudence of Opportunity and
Equality, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 39 (2004); Melanie K. Morris, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Gender Equality: A Reassessment of Her Contribution, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2002).
12 President Clinton’s jurisprudence is not easy to describe, but it was clearly a
jurisprudence of both moderation and political expediency. He supported the death
penalty as both governor of Arkansas and president of the United States. See Stephen
B. Bright, The Politics of Capital Punishment: The Sacrifice of Fairness for Executions, in
JAMES R. ACKER ET AL., AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 127-46, 130-
31 (2d ed. 2003).
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judges with long and moderate track records.13 In an alternate
view, Judge Ginsburg was a “judicial restraint liberal,”14 a liberal
judge who carefully followed precedent and avoided the “judicial
activism” that characterized the Warren Court and put “liberals”
like Clinton on the political defensive since the election of 1968.15
While Ginsburg was well known as an abortion rights activist and
feminist, she was, like Clinton, a moderate on crime and criminal
procedure issues. Even after sitting on the D.C. Circuit, she lacked
death penalty experience at the time of her confirmation.16 De-
spite the fact that she “had made her name as the nation’s leading
litigator for women’s equality in the 1970s[,]. . . [on] the D.C. Cir-
cuit, the cautiously intelligent Ginsburg developed a record of
solid conservatism on issues of criminal law.”17
Unlike many prior nominees to the United States Supreme
Court, Judge Ginsburg could not avoid the woman’s right to pri-
vacy constellation of issues because of her prominence in the for-
mulation of that law. She had appeared four times before the
Supreme Court in women’s rights cases, the first time winning a
“C+” grade in Justice Blackmun’s notes.18 There can be no ques-
tion that, as her “handlers” prepared her to appear before the U.S.
Senate confirmation hearings, they chose to deal with her women’s
rights jurisprudence head-on and to vigorously defend her posi-
tions. The Clinton Administration must have calculated—cor-
13 Mark Silverstein & William Haltom, You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Reflec-
tions on the Ginsburg and Breyer Nominations, 12 J.L. & POL. 459, 459-61 (1996).
14 Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Sense of Judicial Limits, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1994 at A1.
15 President Clinton was deliberately “moderate” in his judicial nominations, and
pro-death penalty on both the Arkansas and national levels. His appointment of Jus-
tice Ginsburg, however, raised liberal hopes that she would become an activist judge
in the Warren Court model. See Christopher E. Smith, et al., The First Term Performance
of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 78 JUDICATURE 74, 74-77 (1994).
16 The District of Columbia Circuit does not include any jurisdictions with an ac-
tive death penalty because the District of Columbia does not have the death penalty.
See HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 9 (1997). Similarly, Judge
Breyer sat on the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, a circuit with no
active death penalty. Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Pu-
erto Rico are covered by that circuit. See Iguartua de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d
80, 85 n.4 (1st Cir. 2000). Of those jurisdictions, only New Hampshire has the death
penalty and that state has not had any executions in the modern death penalty era.
States Without the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center, 2004, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=121&scid=11; BEDAU, supra note
16, at 9; Consequently, both judges faced the Senate confirmation hearings without
any record of opinions or votes in death penalty cases.
17 EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 513-14 (1998).
18 Linda Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a Justice: Between Cases, Bet-
ting Pools, Kind Notes and Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A1.
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rectly—that she would play very well to both women and liberals
on those issues, daring conservative Republican senators to block
her on these grounds.
Judge Ginsburg’s death penalty strategy at the confirmation
hearings was clear. Since she had no record on the issue, she would
decline to discuss her views on the death penalty. This strategy, also
employed by Justice Kennedy and other nominees, stemmed from
the view that judicial nominees should not speculate, in advance,
on how they might rule on any particular case or issue.19 It is fun-
damental jurisprudence that each case stands on its own facts and
on the particular arguments and contexts of that case only—even
though any legal scholar will connect lines of cases and show how
they are interrelated. Ginsburg did say that as a justice she would
uphold the law, but that statement as a position on the death pen-
alty was arguably unclear because the U.S. Constitution, according
to some views, prohibits the death penalty even though the current
majority of the Court has found otherwise.20
The only tense moments at her confirmation hearings oc-
curred when Judge Ginsburg refused several times to answer ques-
tions about her position on the death penalty.21 Senator Grassley of
Iowa raised the issue of an American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) amicus brief that Ginsburg had authored, along with a
number of other women’s rights organizations, in Coker v. Georgia,22
a 1977 Supreme Court case holding that the punishment of death
was disproportionate to the crime of rape in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.23 Unfortunately for Senator Grassley, the position
that Ginsburg advocated was the one adopted by the majority by a
seven-to-two vote, with the respected and conservative Justice Byron
White writing the opinion for a plurality of the Court.24 Thus,
19 See Neil A. Lewis, Ginsburg Deflects Pressure to Talk on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July
23, 1993, at A1.
20 See id.
21 Baugh et al., supra note 6, at 9-10.
22 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent in Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (No. 75-5444) [hereinafter ACLU Brief], microformed
on U.S. Supreme Court Records and Briefs, Fiche 9-10 (Microcard Ed.).
23 433 U.S. at 584.
24 Id. White’s failure to gain a majority for his opinion, even though the Court
voted seven-to-two to reverse, was consistent with the complexity of the division on the
Court on death penalty issues in the modern era of death penalty jurisprudence that
developed after Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Brennan and Marshall con-
curred, believing that the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment, and that no
proportionality analysis was necessary. Coker, 433 U.S. at 600. Justice Powell concurred
with White’s opinion, agreeing with his proportionality analysis on the facts of
Coker–but only to the extent that the victim did not sustain serious or lasting injury, or
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there was little political gain in attacking the substance of her argu-
ment, which has been the law of the land for almost thirty years.
During the confirmation hearing, Judge Ginsburg pointed out
that her argument in the Coker brief was not against the death pen-
alty per se, but for the narrower proposition that the death penalty
for rape was disproportionate to the offense and therefore im-
peded the administration of justice in rape cases.25 For example,
the third argument in her amicus brief was that because the death
sentence was so severe, it might induce juries to acquit, thereby
defeating justice in some rape cases.26
The amicus brief had been so narrowly crafted and careful in
its argument that it did no damage to her nomination. But, in its
context, it was an anti-death penalty document. The leading role of
the ACLU in the long march to abolish the death penalty in the
1960s and 1970s is well known.27 Racism in the administration of
justice, particularly in the South, was a key argument in the consti-
tutional battle over the death penalty, and in rape cases the statis-
tics about the race of capital defendants were particularly
egregious.28 Ginsburg’s brief cited a wide range of social science
data against the death penalty for rape.29 Yet, the brief was care-
fully constructed to avoid discussion of the general application of
the death penalty in murder cases because this issue was lost the
year before in Gregg v. Georgia.30 Ginsburg’s brief aimed to limit the
scope of the death penalty, which was in its formative stages in post-
Gregg federal jurisprudence. The brief is also a powerful feminist
document, linking the death penalty for rape with the patriarchal
foundation of law as primarily protecting the male property inter-
est in women’s purity.31
As a jurist on the Court of Appeals, Judge Ruth Bader Gins-
burg in 1993 was far removed from the law professor she had been
in 1977 when she wrote the Coker brief. She carefully cultivated a
that the rape was committed with unusual brutality, thus leaving open the possibility
that the death penalty might be appropriate in some future rape case. Id. at 601. Only
Burger and Rehnquist defended the position that the death penalty was not dispro-
portionate to the crime of rape. Id. at 604.
25 ACLU Brief, supra note 22, at 9.
26 Id. at 22-31. This argument also applies to murder cases and has been so argued.
See BEDAU, supra note 16, at 187.
27 See WILLIAM J. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA,
1864-1982, at 16-17 (1984); Kirchmeier, Moratorium, supra note 3, at 12-15.
28 ACLU Brief, supra note 22, at 9-21.
29 Id. at 25-28.
30 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
31 ACLU Brief, supra note 22, at 9-21.
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role as a moderate judge—not an activist one—and this role se-
cured her appointment to the Supreme Court.32 On the D.C. Cir-
cuit, she voted more often with President Reagan appointee
Kenneth Starr than with her liberal colleagues on the bench.33 At
her Supreme Court confirmation hearing, she emphasized her
commitment to judicial restraint, stating that judges were “third in
line” in the Constitution, and should “secure a steady, upright and
impartial administration of the laws.”34
Judges change throughout their lives with respect to the death
penalty, as the careers of Justices Powell and Blackmun illustrate.35
It is impossible to know with certainty what forces moved Judge
Ginsburg as a Court of Appeals judge. Perhaps she was influenced
by the success of the women’s rights movement, as the middle class
reformist roots of the women’s rights movement found a comforta-
ble home on the federal bench, now filled with respected woman
judges.
Judge Ginsburg’s outspoken positions as a feminist branded
her a liberal in the eyes of some,36 but the Republican Senators
were unable to draw her out on the death penalty or other social
issues. Throughout her confirmation hearings, she vigorously de-
fended her work in women’s rights cases, but refused to discuss her
views in other areas of the law.37 When pushed on the issue of the
death penalty, she asserted that she would be “scrupulous in apply-
ing law on the basis of legislation and precedent.”38 On August 3,
1993, the Senate confirmed Justice Ginsburg by a vote of ninety-six
to three, and she joined the Court for the 1993-94 term.39
32 See Baugh et al., supra note 6, at 4.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 8.
35 Although Justice Blackmun joined the plurality in upholding the death penalty
in Gregg, at the end of his career on the bench he concluded that the death penalty
was unconstitutional. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice Powell had a similar conversion after he
retired from the bench. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors:
The Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL. RTS. J. 345, 452-53 (1998) [hereinafter Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating
Factors].
36 See Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Ginsburg and the Middle Way, 68 BROOK. L. REV.
629, 629 (2003).
37 See Baugh et al., supra note 6, at 9-10.
38 Kuo & Wang, supra note 1, at 863.
39 Senate Confirms Ginsburg, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Aug. 3, 1993, at A1.
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III. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S VOTES AND OPINIONS TO
UPHOLD DEATH SENTENCES
Like every Supreme Court Justice in the modern death penalty
era, with the exception of Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice
Ginsburg has cast votes to uphold the death penalty in certain
cases. During her time on the Court so far, however, she has never
written a majority opinion to permit a capital defendant to be exe-
cuted.40 Further, she has never written a dissenting opinion to ob-
ject to the Court reversing a death sentence.41 She has, however,
joined the majority in upholding executions.
A. Her Early Death Penalty Decisions as a Justice
As artfully as Ginsburg avoided discussion of her death penalty
jurisprudence in her confirmation hearings, she could not avoid
voting on death penalty cases in her every term on the Court. In
her first vote on a death penalty case, on September 1, 1993, she
voted for a stay of execution in James v. Collins,42 along with Justices
Stevens and Blackmun.43 Justice Ginsburg voted for other stays of
execution,44 though not for all stay requests,45 before the Court
issued its first death penalty opinion with her as a Justice.46
Besides her votes on petitions for writ of certiorari and stay
requests, and her one dissenting opinion,47 Justice Ginsburg joined
her first majority opinion upholding a death sentence in Tuilaepa
v. California.48 Joining Justice Stevens, she concurred in voting to
uphold the death penalty.49
Justice Ginsburg may have recalled her own brief in Coker as
she faced the grisly facts of the Tuilaepa case. Bonnie Stendal, a
fifty-five year-old schoolteacher from northern California was raped
40 See infra Part IV.
41 This information is based on reviewing cases from a Westlaw search of the Su-
preme Court database, conducted on April 10, 2004, using the search terms: “DIS
(death w/2 penalty) & OP (ginsburg).” (Source results on file with the New York City
Law Review.)
42 James v. Collins, 509 U.S. 947 (1993) (Mem.).
43 See id.
44 See, e.g., Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 1122 (1994) (involving the issue of the
constitutionality of hanging as a method of execution). Ginsburg voted to grant the
stay of execution. Id.
45 See, e.g., Nethery v. Texas, 511 U.S. 1123 (1994).
46 See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
47 See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 15 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Romano
was Justice Ginsburg’s first death penalty opinion as a Supreme Court Justice. See infra
Part V(A).
48 512 U.S. at 981.
49 Id.
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and murdered in the course of a burglary in Long Beach.50 At issue
was California’s death penalty statute, rewritten with a list of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances to conform to the require-
ments of modern death penalty statutes, as set out in Gregg.51
Tuilaepa challenged the application of four of the aggravating
factors as they applied to him, arguing that they were unconstitu-
tionally vague.52 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, upheld the
decision by methodically concluding that each of the factors was
reasonable within the framework of Gregg.53 Given the gruesome
facts of the case, it was not difficult to apply the Court’s standards
for aggravating factors. From the standpoint of stare decisis, Gregg,
which set forth the modern “aggravating factors-based” structure of
most death penalty statutes, controlled.54
Justice Ginsburg had a clear chance to stake out her death
penalty jurisprudence in this case. However, Justice Harry Black-
mun alone dissented.55 Justice Blackmun reasoned that each ag-
gravator had to be analyzed for clarity, objectivity, and principled
guidance.56 Employing that analysis, Justice Blackmun concluded
that the California statute was unconstitutionally vague because it
did not provide sufficient guidance for determining whether a
given factor was present, and because the factors were so broadly
defined, they could be found in any case.57 Consequently, he rea-
soned, the statute created the risk of placing “an arbitrary thumb
on death’s side of the scale.”58 While such factors as age, circum-
stances of the crime, and prior criminal activity might make sense
in the abstract, any juror could view them in any way, “convincing
jurors that just about anything is aggravating.”59
50 Id. at 970.
51 See id. at 975.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 976.
54 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The standard for a constitutional death
penalty statute after Gregg v. Georgia was one that provided for “guided discretion” in
the administration of the penalty–for a way to guide juries in deciding which murder-
ers should be subject to the death penalty. See Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating
Factors, supra note 35, at 353-60. The Georgia statute, approved by the Supreme Court
in Gregg, was structured around a list of aggravating factors. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197.
While several other death penalty structures exist, the formula approved in Gregg is
the most common. See ROBERT M. BOHM, DEATHQUEST II: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 28-35 (2d ed.
2003).
55 Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 984 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 986.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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In later cases, Justice Ginsburg became increasingly sensitive
to due process and to procedural issues in death penalty cases. Be-
cause she did not write in Tuilaepa, we have no idea what her view
of Justice Blackmun’s argument was, but her vote speaks volumes.
Whatever the procedural concerns, the California statute was ac-
ceptable as a death penalty statute because it met the Gregg stan-
dard, and thus she followed stare decisis in a Court that had long
recognized that the death penalty was constitutional. Justice Gins-
burg refused to align herself with Justice Blackmun and instead was
among the justices who would, as Justice Blackmun later put it,
“tinker with the machinery of death.”60 Regardless of her personal
views on the death penalty, she was committed to administering
the death penalty within the constitutional scheme set out in Gregg
and subsequent cases. This approach led Justice Ginsburg down a
difficult path that challenged her to draw the nebulous line be-
tween life and death. Yet, this route was the same course traveled
by all of the sitting justices of the Court: Justices Stevens and Souter
also joined the opinion in Tuilaepa in upholding the death penalty.
B. Justice Ginsburg’s Other Votes and Opinions Upholding the
Death Penalty
To date, Justice Ginsburg has not written a majority opinion
upholding a death sentence.61 One of Justice Ginsburg’s first writ-
ten opinions upholding a death penalty came in a concurring
opinion in Victor v. Nebraska,62 where the Court addressed the due
60 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun, one of the Gregg majority, ultimately concluded that the death penalty
could not be fairly applied:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of
death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored–indeed, I have strug-
gled–along with the majority of this Court, to develop procedural and
substantive rules that would lend more than the mere appearance of
fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than to continue to cod-
dle the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has been
achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and
intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experi-
ment has failed.
Id. at 1145 (citation omitted).
Blackmun’s personal evolution on death penalty law was profound: in Furman v.
Georgia, he had dissented, finding no problem with Georgia’s death penalty statute.
408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Yet, over time, he had become
profoundly anti-death penalty in his thinking. See Linda Greenhouse, Documents Reveal
an Evolution of a Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A1, A22-23.
61 See infra Part III.
62 Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994). The case was joined with Sandoval v. Califor-
nia in the opinion. See id.
2004] SCRUPULOUS IN APPLYING THE LAW 251
process issue of the meaning of the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
standard of proof in criminal cases, specifically in death penalty
cases.63 The majority, citing In re Winship64 for the proposition that
the guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard was constitutionally
required for criminal convictions, held both that there was no con-
stitutional requirement for any particular language in defining that
standard and that the instructions in the cases before the Court
were adequate.65 The majority noted the difficulty of the concept
and acknowledged some potential for vagueness and misunder-
standing on the part of the jury, but held that these problems did
not violate the due process required by the constitution.66
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment upholding both
death penalty convictions.67 Perhaps in a nod to her long career as
a teacher of civil procedure,68 she did suggest there was a defini-
tion of “reasonable doubt” proposed by the Federal Judicial Center
that was “clear, straightforward, and accurate” and gave clear gui-
dance to jurors.69 After endorsing the proposed definition, she also
noted that the Supreme Court had no supervisory power over state
courts and that the test was not whether the instruction given at
trial was “exemplary” but whether it was reasonable.70 Her concur-
rence avoided the issue of whether there was sufficient jury confu-
sion in the cases to produce an erroneous verdict.71
In Bell v. Cone, Justice Ginsburg joined a majority opinion writ-
ten by Chief Justice Rehnquist that upheld a Tennessee death pen-
alty by an eight to one vote, with Justice Stevens dissenting.72 While
there was an underlying habeas corpus issue regarding the recent
limitations on habeas corpus relief under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, the main issue in Bell concerned the
effective assistance of counsel in a death penalty case under the
Strickland v. Washington test.73 The facts of Bell74 were not very dif-
63 Id.
64 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
65 511 U.S. at 5, 22-23.
66 Id. at 21.
67 Id. at 23-28.
68 See Herma Hill Kay, Celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg’s Appointment to the Supreme Court of the United States, 104 COL. L. REV. 1, 11-17
(2004).
69 Victor, 511 U.S. at 24.
70 Id. at 27.
71 Id. at 1, 23-28. Arguably, this early decision by Justice Ginsburg is inconsistent
with her later decisions, which emphasize the importance of the role of juries and the
fact that they must receive accurate information. See infra Part IV(B) and V(A).
72 535 U.S. 685 (2002).
73 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Strickland test is two-pro-
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ferent from those of Strickland.75 Cone’s lawyer had presented a
reasonable defense at trial: although admitting guilt to a string of
vicious killings, Cone claimed insanity due to traumatic exper-
iences as a Vietnam veteran as well as drug addiction.76 Following
this defense and a guilty conviction, the lawyer failed to present an
effective case at the sentencing hearing.77
The Strickland test sets a very high standard for reversal of a
death penalty case on the grounds of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, and this high standard has been troubling to many legal schol-
ars.78 Justice Ginsburg joined the Rehnquist opinion, finding no
constitutional violation in Cone’s representation.79 Justice Stevens
strongly dissented, pointing out what he saw as the clear inade-
quacy of Cone’s defense.80
In sum, Justice Ginsburg’s opinions and votes to uphold ex-
ecutions exist, though they are not common. Her opinions and
votes in cases to reverse capital sentences or convictions provide
greater insight into her capital punishment jurisprudence.
IV. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S MAJORITY OPINIONS
ON THE DEATH PENALTY
In her first eleven years on the Supreme Court, Justice Gins-
burg has written only three majority opinions in death penalty
cases. It was not until the 2000-2001 term that she authored the
first of her death penalty majority opinions.81 All three of her opin-
ions were written for cases in which the Court struck down the
death penalty, and each of the majority opinions garnered a seven-
nged, requiring first that the lawyer’s conduct be reasonable in the context of the
practice of other lawyers, while giving great weight to the range of professional
choices lawyers must make in defense work. Id. at 690. Second, the test requires that
the lawyer’s deficient conduct (assuming the first prong is met) prejudice the defen-
dant. Id. at 691-92.
74 535 U.S. at 689-93.
75 466 U.S. at 671-72.
76 Bell, 535 U.S. at 712-13.
77 Id. at 712-15.
78 See, e.g., Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique
of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part One), 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1327, 1353 (1995) (stat-
ing, “[a]fter Strickland, the courts will rarely, if ever, seriously review cases of substan-
dard lawyering–even in capital cases.”); Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System,
Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. SOC.
CHANGE 59, 67 (1986) (stating that Strickland appears to be “designed to help review-
ing courts deal efficiently with these claims rather than seriously address the potential
injustice problems caused by incompetent trial counsel”).
79 Bell, 535 U.S. at 687.
80 Id. at 707-19.
81 See Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001).
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two majority. As Justice Stevens once noted, a seven-two decision is
“virtually unanimous” for the Court in the oft-divided area of death
penalty jurisprudence.82
None of Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinions were especially
divisive to the justices. Shafer v. South Carolina,83 where even the two
dissenters conceded the opinion was a “logical extension”84 of a
prior Court decision,85 addressed the due process rights of capital
defendants at sentencing.86 In Banks v. Dretke, the opinion ad-
dressed prosecutor misconduct claims and the two dissenters only
dissented in part, while noting that the point of dissent was “a very
close question.”87 Finally, even in Ring v. Arizona,88 which ad-
dressed the constitutionality of trial judges acting in the role of
fact-finder for aggravating circumstances, the two dissenting Jus-
tices noted that they “understood” why Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
found it necessary to overrule a previous case, even though they
would have overruled a different case.89
A. Justice Ginsburg’s First Majority Opinion in a Capital Case:
Shafer v. South Carolina
In early 2001, during her eighth term as a Supreme Court Jus-
tice, Justice Ginsburg wrote her first capital case majority opinion
in Shafer v. South Carolina.90 The issue in the case was how Simmons
v. South Carolina91 applied to the facts in Shafer.92 Simmons held that
when a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue and the
82 O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 169 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens noted, “In the years following our decision in Furman v. Georgia . . . unani-
mous Court opinions in capital cases have been virtually nonexistent.” Id. at 169 n.2
(citations omitted). Thus, he added, a seven-two decision is almost as close as the
Court gets to unanimous death penalty decisions. See id. at 169.
83 Shafer, 532 U.S. 36.
84 Id. at 55-56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
85 In two separate dissenting opinions, Justices Scalia and Thomas each conceded
that the Shafer majority decision followed logically from Simmons v. South Carolina, 512
U.S. 154 (1994). See Shafer, 536 U.S. at 55 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 55-56 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
86 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 55.
87 Banks v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 1256, 1281 (2004) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
89 Id. at 619 (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissenters
noted the inconsistency between Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Wal-
ton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), but the dissenters would have overruled the for-
mer instead of the latter. Id.
90 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 36.
91 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
92 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 39-40.
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only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the
jury to be informed of the defendant’s parole ineligibility, either in
arguments by counsel or in a jury instruction.93 Justice Ginsburg
had joined the plurality in Simmons, and she also had joined in a
1997 dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens that stressed the impor-
tance of the Simmons rule.94
In Shafer, Justice Ginsburg focused on the issue of what op-
tions were available to the jury. She concluded that once the jury
found an aggravating factor, its only options were death or life
without parole, even though it would have been possible for the
defendant to receive a sentence less than life without parole had
the jury not found any aggravating factors.95 Here, if future danger-
ousness were raised, the jury instructions were insufficient because
the jurors had been instructed not only that “‘life imprisonment
means until death of the offender’ but also that ‘[p]arole eligibility
or ineligibility is not for your consideration.’”96 Thus, the South
Carolina Supreme Court misinterpreted Simmons by holding that
the case did not apply to the sentencing scheme in Shafer.97
After concluding that Simmons applied to this sentencing
scheme, Justice Ginsburg found that the case needed to be re-
manded to determine whether the Simmons instruction should
have been given.98 The Simmons instruction needed only to have
been given if future dangerousness had been raised at sentenc-
ing.99 In Shafer, unlike in Simmons, the prosecutor did not specifi-
cally argue for, and the jury did not find, the aggravating factor of
“future dangerousness” during the sentencing proceedings.100
93 Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171.
94 See O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 169 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
majority in O’Dell held that Simmons created a “new rule” for Teague v. Lane purposes
and therefore it did not apply to the petitioner. Id. at 166; See also Teague v. Lane 489
U.S. 288 (1989). The dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, however, rea-
soned that the rule created by Simmons was too important to fundamental principles
not to have retroactive effect:
Even if the rule in Simmons could properly be viewed as a “new” rule, it
is of such importance to the accuracy and fairness of a capital sentenc-
ing proceeding that it should be applied consistently to all prisoners
whose death sentences were imposed in violation of the rule, whether
they were sentenced before Simmons was decided or after.
Id. at 173. See also Simmons, 512 U.S. 154.
95 Shafer, 532 U.S. at 49-51.
96 Id. at 39-40 (citation omitted).
97 Id. at 51.
98 Id. at 54-55.
99 Id. at 36.
100 Id. at 54.
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However, the State introduced evidence of Shafer’s criminal re-
cord and aggressive conduct.101 Justice Ginsburg remanded the
case for determination of whether “future dangerousness” had
been raised in the case.102
Shafer was an interesting, but not revolutionary, opinion,
where Justice Ginsburg built upon the Court’s holding in Simmons,
a case in which Justice Ginsburg had joined the plurality.103 In ef-
fect, Shafer did not impose new due process obligations on states,
but it clarified when existing rights applied. The opinion is
straightforward and focuses on the details of the South Carolina
sentencing process, the facts of Shafer’s sentencing, and the appli-
cation of Simmons to that process, without much discussion of the
policy behind the due process right requiring juries to be informed
of the sentencing options. The sentencing process used by South
Carolina in Shafer had apparently been adopted by the State to get
around the requirements of Simmons,104 but the majority opinion
was content with correcting the process and did not offer any espe-
cially harsh words for the State.
One commentator has noted “the detached tone” of the Shafer
101 Id. at 40-41. Ultimately, the jury found the aggravating factor of “murder while
attempting armed robbery.” Id. at 45.
102 Id. at 54.
103 Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994). This jurisprudence goes back to
Justice Ginsburg’s first year on the Court. In 1994, the same year as Tuilaepa, she
joined Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter in reversing the death penalty convic-
tion in Simmons v. South Carolina, a case that would later form the foundation of Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Shafer. Simmons, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); Shafter, 532
U.S. 36. Simmons had beaten an elderly woman to death and, in the week before his
death-penalty trial, had pleaded guilty to a number of criminal offenses. Id. at 156. As
a result of these convictions, Simmons was ineligible for parole. Simmons, 512 U.S. at
156.
At his death penalty sentencing hearing, Simmon’s lawyers requested an instruc-
tion that he was never eligible for parole under South Carolina law. Id. at 157. The
prosecution opposed this instruction, which was upheld by the judge, and then ar-
gued to the jury that Simmons should be executed because of his future dangerous-
ness. Id. The judge forbade the defense to mention his parole ineligibility. Id.
Although the main opinion was a plurality decision, the vote on the outcome was
seven-to-two because Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion that was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. Id. at 172 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the plurality is a bold statement of a broad view of the
due process clause: “The Due Process Clause does not allow the execution of a person
on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.” Id. at
161 (quotations omitted). For the plurality, the fundamental core of the place of the
jury in death penalty sentencing was that juries get full information on the conse-
quences of their sentence. See id.
104 See Craig M. Bradley, South Carolina’s Death Penalty Odyssey Continues, 38 TRIAL 68
(2002) (“After Simmons, South Carolina changed its sentencing law in an apparent
effort to avoid the Supreme Court’s holding.”).
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opinion and the way Justice Ginsburg addressed the facts methodi-
cally without any rhetoric about the important rights being pre-
served.105 The commentator called it a “quintessential Ginsburg
opinion.”106 The opinion strengthened an important right in prac-
tice, but it avoided going beyond the facts of the case.
The following year the Supreme Court accepted and reversed
another case from South Carolina in a further attempt to clarify
the Simmons rule for that state.107 In that case, Kelly v. South Caro-
lina, Justice Ginsburg again joined the majority in reversing a
South Carolina death sentence on Simmons grounds.108
B. Ring v. Arizona and the Application of Apprendi to Death
Penalty Sentencing
In 2002, in Ring v. Arizona,109 Justice Ginsburg wrote her sec-
ond majority opinion in a death penalty case, a clear opinion ap-
plying Apprendi v. New Jersey110 to the sentencing phase of death
penalty cases. Apprendi’s complex and far-reaching significance is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, it essentially held that
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial forbids using any aggra-
vating factor not found by a jury as an aggravating factor in sen-
tencing.111 In an era of complex sentencing structures that often
turn on prior actions, Apprendi and Ring had a major impact on
sentencing law, returning to the jury a significant part of the sen-
tencing procedure that had been taken over by judges and proba-
105 Ray, supra note 36, at 646.
106 Id. Professor Ray explained:
Again, there was no mention of the irreversible consequences of a capi-
tal sentence or of the particular care that courts must exercise when
supervising such momentous determinations. The defendant prevailed
and the South Carolina Supreme Court was reversed, but without any
lecture or scolding. The opinion was carefully constructed, clearly
presented and completely unemotional; it is the quintessential Gins-
burg opinion.
Id. at 646-47.
107 The Court further clarified the Simmons right and what constitutes putting “fu-
ture dangerousness” at issue during the following term in Kelly v. South Carolina,
where the Court again reversed a South Carolina death sentence on Simmons grounds.
534 U.S. 246 (2002).
108 Kelly, 534 U.S. at 248.
109 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
110 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Apprendi “held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit
a defendant to be expose[d] . . . to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive
if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.” Ring, 536 U.S. at
588-89 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483) (emphasis in original).
111 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
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tion offices.112
The application of Apprendi to the death penalty had been
raised by some of the justices at the time Apprendi was decided, but
Ring clarified the issue.113 Once Gregg began the modern era of
death penalty jurisprudence, states were required to have struc-
tured death penalty regimes that included specific aggravating and
mitigating factors.114 Some of these considerations were entirely in
the hands of the jury and did not violate Apprendi. But some states
left these matters, entirely or in part, to judges.115 In 1990, in Wal-
ton v. Arizona,116 the Supreme Court upheld Arizona’s death pen-
alty sentencing statute that required the trial judge, sitting alone,
to determine aggravating and mitigating factors after the jury had
decided the question of guilt or innocence. Subsequently, Arizona
executed twenty-two individuals who had been sentenced by
judges.117 In 1994, however, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, joined by
six other justices, overruled Walton and held that Arizona’s sen-
tencing procedure was unconstitutional.118 In effect, Ring invali-
dated the death penalty sentences of defendants in a number of
states.119
Consistent with her opinion in Shafer,120 the Ring decision put
the death penalty in the hands of informed jurors, a populist mea-
sure.121 The issue of whether a judge is better able to decide on
112 See, e.g., Jason E. Barsanti, Ring v. Arizona: The Sixth and Eighth Amendments Col-
lide: Out of the Wreckage Emerges a Constitutional Safeguard for Capital Defendants, 31 PEPP.
L. REV. 519, 573 (2004) (“What is apparent is that Ring has significantly influenced
the sphere of American capital punishment.”); Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But
the Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1477
(2002) (“There is no question that . . . Ring will have some significant repercussions
on the administration of capital punishment.”).
113 See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring). Ring, 536 U.S. 584.
114 For a more general discussion of the history of the modern era of the death
penalty, see Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 35, at 349-60.
115 “Before Ring, of the thirty-eight capital punishment states, eleven employed a
sentencing procedure providing, to some degree, for judicial findings of fact in capi-
tal sentencing.” Barsanti, supra note 112, at 555. Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana,
and Nebraska had statutes that allowed judges to do capital sentencing, and several
other states had statutes that gave a significant role to judges in the sentencing pro-
cess. See Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 35, at 346 n.6.
116 497 U.S 639 (1990).
117 See David G. Savage, Executions Becoming Province of the South, Report Finds, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 2, 2003, at 10.
118 497 U.S. 647. Justice O’Connor wrote in dissent, urging that Apprendi be over-
ruled rather than Walton. Ring, 536 U.S. at 619 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
119 See Steiker, supra note 112, at 1477-82.
120 Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001). See supra Part IV(A).
121 In fact, though, Justice Breyer noted in his concurring opinion that he would
have gone further than the majority opinion. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613-19
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aggravating circumstances was irrelevant in Justice Ginsburg’s anal-
ysis. The Court held that the Constitution’s requirement of trial by
jury includes the right to have the jury, in death penalty cases, de-
termine the aggravating factors that made a defendant eligible for
the death penalty.122 Justice Ginsburg reasoned, “[t]he right to
trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be sense-
lessly diminished if it encompassed the fact-finding necessary to in-
crease a defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the fact-finding
necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth Amendment
applies to both.”123
Despite the broad impact of the Ring decision,124 as in Shafer,
Justice Ginsburg emphasized that she was merely applying prior
precedent to the issue before the Court. As one commentator
noted, “at the level of legal doctrine, the decision [in Ring] was
merely the application of a distinction—Apprendi’s new formula-
tion of the difference between ‘elements’ of a crime and ‘sentenc-
ing factors’—that had been developed over a number of years in
the noncapital context.”125
C. Banks v. Texas: Due Process and Prosecutorial Misconduct
Banks v. Texas126 is a recent majority opinion written by Justice
Ginsburg. It is also significant in that it is only her third death pen-
alty majority opinion for the Court, again in a case with a seven-to-
two vote.127 Every death penalty case has significance beyond its
borders and Banks may stand for a range of issues as the jurispru-
dence of death evolves. As in a number of her earlier opinions, the
(Breyer, J., concurring). He argued that in addition to the Sixth Amendment require-
ment that juries find aggravating factors, he would hold that the Eighth Amendment
requires jury sentencing in capital cases. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Gins-
burg noted the difference of opinion with Justice Breyer in her majority opinion in a
collegial way, noting that she was, “as always, pleased to travel in Justice Breyer’s com-
pany.” Id. at 612.
122 Id. at 609.
123 Id.
124 Although the Ring opinion affected some current death penalty prisoners and
all future cases, the Supreme Court subsequently limited the number of current death
penalty prisoners it affected in Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004). In that five-
four decision, the Court held that Ring created a “new procedural rule” and did not
apply retroactively to death penalty cases already final. Id. at 2526. Justice Ginsburg,
however, joined Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion that argued, “Ring’s requirement
that a jury, and not a judge, must apply the death sentence aggravators announces a
watershed rule of criminal procedure that should be applied retroactively in habeas
proceedings.” Id. at 2531.
125 Steiker, supra note 112, at 1485.
126 Banks v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 1256 (2004).
127 See id.
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underlying issue is the reliability of death penalty judgments in a
politically charged America.
One core concept of the Supreme Court’s death penalty juris-
prudence since Powell v. Alabama128 has been the jurisprudence of
reliability. Beginning with Powell’s interpretation of “due process”
in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court started a new jurispru-
dence of imposing the requirements of the United States Constitu-
tion on state criminal procedures that were unfair and
unreliable.129 The Court found the conviction of the innocent and
their sentencing to long prison terms—or to death—intolerable in
a civilized society and an unfortunate occurrence in American
criminal law.130
The issue in Banks was prosecutorial misconduct. The prose-
cuting attorney knew that prosecution witnesses lied.131 In habeas
corpus proceedings, Banks raised a Brady v. Maryland132 claim, ar-
guing that the state failed to reveal exculpatory evidence.133 The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Banks had not
raised the issue in his state post-conviction proceedings and had
not been diligent in developing the facts underlying his Brady
claim.134 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, the evidence un-
covered in the federal habeas proceeding was procedurally
barred.135
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion turned on a technical analysis of
the scope of review permitted federal courts in habeas cases in the
regime in place prior to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996.136 The narrow issue was Banks’ omission in raising
128 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In the famous “Scottsboro” case, the
Court held that the defendants’ Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated in the
Alabama state trial. Id. at 73.
129 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 553-54 (West Group
2000).
130 This role of the Supreme Court is the purpose of federalism in criminal proce-
dure jurisprudence. The states, historically, have had difficulties providing basic jus-
tice because local factors impede its administration. This is well developed
jurisprudence, dating back to Powell v. Alabama, the foundation of selective incorpora-
tion doctrine in American criminal procedure. While Chief Justice Rehnquist has
called for a “new federalism” and for the return of basic criminal law to the states, the
states, in turn, have a duty to provide reliable trials. See Sue Davis, Rehnquist, William
Hobbs, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 715-
17 (Kermit Hall et al., eds. 1992). This is especially true in death penalty cases.
131 Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1263.
132 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
133 Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1268.
134 Id. at 1270.
135 Id.
136 Justice Ginsburg noted that because of the timing of Banks’ petition, the stan-
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the State’s failure to provide exculpatory evidence under Brady—
an omission that occurred because Banks had no idea that Texas
prosecutors were engaging in misconduct.137 The state of Texas
wanted to engage in misconduct at trial, hide the issue on appeal,
and then argue that the defendant had waived the issue because he
had not raised it earlier.
The case raised the question of whether the result of any crim-
inal trial can be reliable if the prosecution engages in misconduct
and gets away with it as “harmless error.” Justice Ginsburg weighed
in decisively on this point. She concluded, inter alia, that Banks did
show “cause” for the failure to raise the claim earlier, that the sup-
pressed evidence was material and resulted in prejudice to Banks,
and that the elements of Brady were satisfied.138 Finally, she con-
cluded that the District Court and Court of Appeals erred in deny-
ing Banks a certificate of appealability.139
Again, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is a straightforward applica-
tion of the law without much rhetorical flourish. As one commen-
tator noted, even in cases raising issues close to Justice Ginsburg’s
heart, she “refrains from sweeping statements or ringing pro-
nouncements, and she does not provide her readers with a supply
of readily quotable passages.”140 In Banks, she did not dwell on the
conduct of the prosecutors in the case with adjectives to emphasize
the outrageous conduct, but she presented the facts and reasoning
in a logical, direct manner. Yet, the former law professor did take
the State to task for its poor legal reasoning at oral argument
before the Supreme Court, where the State argued, in effect, that
“‘the prosecutor can lie and conceal and the prisoner still has the
burden to . . . discover the evidence.’”141 In a subtle way, she chas-
tised the State by asserting that “[a] rule thus declaring ‘prosecutor
dards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214, 28
U.S.C. § 2254, did not apply. Id. at 1270 n.9 (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336-
37 (1997)).
137 Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 1272-74.
138 Id. at 1272-79.
139 Id. at 1279-80. “ ‘To obtain a certificate of appealability, a prisoner must ‘demon-
strate that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his
constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Id. at 1280 (quoting Miller-El v. Cock-
rell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003)).
140 Ray, supra note 36, at 680-81. Professor Ray added that Justice Ginsburg’s “opin-
ions tend to look inward rather than outward. They are scholarly in tone and likely to
contain detailed procedural histories, multiple footnotes and abundant citations to
precedent. They are not, however, likely to stake out broad positions that might con-
strain her options in later cases.” Id. at 681.
141 Id. at 1275 (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. 35).
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may hide, defendant must seek,’ is not tenable in a system constitu-
tionally bound to accord defendants due process.”142
V. JUSTICE GINSBURG’S OTHER OPINIONS AND VOTES TO
REVERSE DEATH SENTENCES
Because of the limited number of opinions by Justice Gins-
burg upholding the death penalty, her opinions supporting votes
to strike down the death penalty are essential to understanding her
views about the constitutional requirements of death penalty pro-
cedures. As noted above, all three of her majority opinions in
death penalty cases have been in cases where the capital sentences
were overturned. While she has rarely written concurring opinions
in capital cases, she has written several dissenting opinions that ar-
gue for reversals of capital sentences or convictions.143
A. Speaking to a Future Age: Justice Ginsburg’s Dissenting Opinions
Dissenting opinions serve a unique role in American jurispru-
dence. As Justice Ginsburg has noted, “Dissents speak to a future
age. So that is the dissenter’s hope: that they are writing not for
today, but for tomorrow.”144 On a broad scale, one commentator
has called Justice Ginsburg “a moderate dissenter, willing to voice
her disagreement with the majority on a regular basis and unwill-
ing to embrace consensus at any cost.”145
Most of Justice Ginsburg’s writing in death penalty cases has
been in dissent, with a focus on procedural fairness and in defense
of a broader standard for habeas corpus review of state death pen-
alty cases. While she has made it clear—as in Cone—that she will
uphold death penalty verdicts, many of her votes have placed her
in the minority of the Court on death penalty issues, frequently
joining Justices Souter, Breyer, and Stevens either in dissent or car-
rying one or two additional justices and reversing death penalty
convictions.146
142 Id. at 1275.
143 See, e.g., Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994).
144 Thomas Adcock, CUNY Law School Hosts Justice Ginsburg, N.Y. LAWYER, Mar. 19,
2004, at 16.
145 Ray, supra note 36, at 655. Professor Ray further explained:
[l]ike Justice Brennan, whose defense of dissent she has cited with ap-
proval, Ginsburg recognizes that the act of dissenting is not a betrayal of
institutional values. Rather, it is an essential part of a Justice’s role, an
occasion when, in her terms, the tug of individuality properly defeats
the rival tug of collegiality.
Id.
146 See, e.g., Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 118 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
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1. Justice Ginsburg’s First Dissenting Opinion in a Capital
Case
Justice Ginsburg’s belief in the integrity of the jury in death
penalty sentencing, illustrated by her majority opinions in Ring and
Shafer, emerged from her dissent in Romano v. Oklahoma,147 another
case from her first year on the Court, which was her first writing in
a death penalty case. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter joined
her dissenting opinion in a five-to-four decision.148
In Romano, the jury was told in the penalty phase of the trial
that the defendant had already been sentenced to death in another
case.149 While evidence of the defendant’s dangerousness was in
the purview of the sentencing phase, here the issue was whether or
not this information reduced the jury’s personal responsibility for
the fate of the defendant.150
Justice Ginsburg began her analysis in the dissenting opinion
with a discussion of Caldwell v. Mississippi151 in which the Court
struck down a death sentence because the prosecutor told the jury
that the jury’s decision was not final because it was reviewable by an
appellate court.152 Basing her reasoning upon Caldwell, Justice
Ginsburg wrote that the jurors’ knowledge that Romano would be
executed anyway, regardless of their verdict, reduced their respon-
sibility for their verdict.153 Her opinion also emphasized one of the
foundations of her capital punishment jurisprudence: The belief
that a carefully structured jury system was critical to death penalty
procedure, insuring reliability.154
senting in opinion joined by JJ. Stevens, Souter, and Breyer) (reasoning that after a
state-mandated entry of a life sentence following a jury deadlock, the double jeopardy
clause prevents the imposition of the death penalty at a new sentencing hearing);
Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 171 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in an opinion
joined by JJ. Stevens, Souter, and Breyer) (reasoning that a habeas petitioner was
denied the right to a full, fair, and effective opportunity to defend himself at the
penalty phase and that no new rule was implicated in his habeas petition).
147 512 U.S. 1 (1994).
148 Id. at 15.
149 Id. at 15-25.
150 Id. at 3.
151 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
152 Id. at 328-33. The Court in Caldwell held that “it is constitutionally impermissible
to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to
believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s
death rests elsewhere.” Id. at 328-29.
153 Romano, 512 U.S. at 16.
154 Id. at 15-25.
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2. Justice Ginsburg’s Dissents from Denials of Requests for
Stays of Execution.
Justice Ginsburg’s dissents in denials of applications for stays
of execution may be seen as embodying a procedural approach. In
her view, a criminal defendant can always be executed later, after
the courts have carefully considered procedural remedies. For ex-
ample, in Republic of Paraguay v. Gilmore,155 a case involving the cap-
ital trial of a Paraguayan national, the petitioner argued that he
was tried, convicted and sentenced to death without notification of
the Counsel of Paraguay as required by the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations.156 Justice Ginsburg’s expressed disappoint-
ment in the Court’s failure to grant a stay of execution, pointing
out that it was the condemned’s first federal petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.157
Considering cases without opinions, significantly, Justice Gins-
burg so far has voted in the minority to grant stays of executions or
deny applications to vacate stays of executions in more than 150
cases while on the Supreme Court.158 Her voice on these low-pro-
file cases illustrates her concern about the fairness of the death
penalty even in these forgotten cases without a Supreme Court
opinion.159
3. Justice Ginsburg and the Writ of Habeas Corpus
No discussion of death penalty jurisprudence is complete with-
out considering habeas corpus, a procedural area of the law that is
intertwined with the rights of capital defendants. With roots ex-
tending back almost 800 years, the writ of habeas corpus, the
“Great Writ,” gives every person who is imprisoned access to the
courts to force the government to legally justify his or her impris-
155 523 U.S. 371 (2000).
156 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S.
No. 6820 (1970) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
157 See Gilmore, 523 U.S. at 381. Justice Ginsburg dissented on the same grounds in a
previous case raising a Vienna Convention claim. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,
381 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
158 A Westlaw search of the terms “Ginsburg /100 (stay /5 execution)” in the Su-
preme Court database reveals 193 results (last checked Oct. 24, 2004). Some of those
results were from the beginning of her career, stating she did not participate in the
decisions. Also, a few are early decisions where Justice Ginsburg concurred in the
decision to deny a stay of execution request. See, e.g., Guinan v. Delo, 510 U.S. 909
(1993).
159 Many of the cases simply mark her vote on the stay applications and do not have
opinions by the majority or the dissent. See, e.g., Stewart v. Mata, 518 U.S. 1042 (1996).
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onment.160 Over the years, both Congress and the Court have re-
stricted habeas corpus rights and limited access to federal courts of
prisoners in state custody.161 Justice Ginsburg has read the law to
be consistent with its purpose of allowing access to the federal
courts by state prisoners to protect federal constitutional rights.
This reading is important inasmuch as the Supreme Court has be-
come increasingly concerned with both inadequate procedural
protections in state courts in death penalty cases and with the fail-
ure of state appellate courts to actively police their lower courts’
death penalty trials.
Justice Ginsburg’s concern about the quality of justice was
manifested in her dissenting opinion in Gray v. Netherland,162 a five-
to-four case involving a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, where
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer again joined her opinion.163
On the facts, Gray received an unfair trial.164 He was convicted of
murder, largely on the testimony of a co-defendant who was of-
fered a deal in return for his testimony. Gray’s lawyers were con-
cerned about a rumor that the prosecution would attempt to
introduce evidence that Gray had bragged about two unsolved and
particularly vicious murders several years before.165 At a pre-trial
hearing, they raised this concern with the judge and were assured
by the prosecutor that he only would introduce the testimony of a
jailhouse informer about the prior crime and nothing else.166 The
defense attorney was not prepared for additional evidence about
the prior crime, and had been reassured that only the jailhouse
testimony would be introduced.167
Once the petitioner was convicted, the prosecution, in a sur-
prise move, revealed that it would use other evidence at sentenc-
ing, including evidence from the state medical examiner who
performed two autopsies, evidence from a detective, and vivid
crime scene photos, including ones of the burned body of a
child.168 The defense objected to this new evidence concerning an
160 See, e.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2.3 (3d ed. 2001).
161 See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections on 28
U.S.C.); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
162 518 U.S. 152, 171 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 Id. at 156.
166 Id. at 157.
167 Id. at 157.
168 Id.
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unadjudicated crime being used without notice, but the court al-
lowed the evidence at the sentencing hearing.169 Gray was given
the death sentence, partly upon this evidence of additional
murders of which he had not been convicted. An appeal and state
habeas corpus petition were denied by the Virginia courts.170 Sub-
sequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit denied habeas corpus relief.171
The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the petitioner’s Brady
v. Maryland172 claim that the prosecutor should have disclosed the
evidence was procedurally defaulted because the defendant failed
to raise the claim in state court.173 Because the petitioner did not
fully litigate his due process rights in the Virginia state courts, Gray
was denied relief.174
Further, the Court held that prior case law did not require the
prosecutor to disclose the evidence under the Due Process
Clause,175 and for the petitioner to prevail on this due process
claim, the Court would have to adopt a new rule.176 Therefore, the
Court reasoned, under Teague v. Lane,177 the petitioner could not
obtain habeas relief.178 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, arguing that
there was a due process violation and that no “new rule” was impli-
cated under Teague, is an indictment of the quality of justice in the
case.179 The prosecutor lied to Gray and his lawyer, a lie that was
upheld by the trial judge.180 Justice Ginsburg wrote a powerful de-
fense of the need for habeas corpus as a remedy in such cases,
pointing out that this situation was exactly the type of violation that
the writ was designed to remedy.181 She reasoned, “[t]here is noth-
ing ‘new’ in a rule that capital defendants must be afforded a
169 Id.
170 Id. at 158-60.
171 Id.
172 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
173 Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-62 (citing Brady, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
174 Id. at 161-62.
175 Id. at 168. Gray made two Due Process claims: (1) the Commonwealth failed to
give him adequate notice it would use the evidence; and (2) the Commonwealth mis-
led Gray about the evidence it intended to use. See id. at 162.
176 Id. at 169-70.
177 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989).
178 Gray, 518 U.S. at 170.
179 Id. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 157. Justice Ginsburg noted, “Gray’s lawyers were undeniably caught short
by the prosecutor’s startling announcement, the night before the penalty phase was to
begin, that he would in effect put on a ‘mini-trial’ of the Sorrell murders. . . . Thus, at
the penalty trial, defense counsel were reduced nearly to the role of spectators.” Id. at
184.
181 Id. at 180-86.
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meaningful opportunity to defend against the State’s penalty phase
evidence.”182
Her dissent is consistent with her belief that procedural fair-
ness is critical in order for the death penalty, or criminal law gener-
ally, to be reliable.183 The fact that she had to dissent, and that her
position lost, is a sad indictment of the state of death penalty law in
America. While the issue was a narrow technical one—the scope of
new laws restricting habeas review by federal courts—the underly-
ing substantive issue is the poor quality of state criminal justice in
America, especially in death penalty cases.184
B. Justice Ginsburg’s Other Votes to Reverse Death Sentences
Justice Ginsburg also has joined opinions reversing death
sentences where she did not write a separate opinion. For example,
she joined in a six-to-three majority, reversing the death penalty in
Penry v. Johnson (“Penry II”).185 John Paul Penry was convicted of
rape and murder in 1979, and his first case was decided by the
Supreme Court in 1989, where the Court held, inter alia, that the
three special questions given to sentencing jurors to consider did
not allow for full consideration of the mitigating evidence of
Penry’s mental impairment.186 His second appeal to the Supreme
Court included the issue of whether the Texas courts had com-
plied with Penry I in the jury instructions given at Penry’s second
182 Id. at 181.
183 Her concern about procedural fairness in habeas corpus cases also is illustrated
by her dissenting opinion in the recent non-capital case of Pliler v. Ford, 124 S. Ct.
2441 (2004). In that case, she was concerned about the stay-and-abeyance procedure
used in the case and whether the pro se petitioner was informed of the options. Id. at
2448-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
184 Not narrow and technical at all, and consistent with Justice Ginsburg’s belief
that procedural fairness is fundamental in death penalty jurisprudence, is her indict-
ment of the poor quality of defense lawyering in many death penalty cases. In a
speech at University of the District of Columbia Law School, she said, “I have yet to
see a death case, among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve of execu-
tion petitions, in which the defendant was well represented at trial.” Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, In Pursuit of the Public Good: Lawyers Who Care, Joseph L. Rauh Lecture (Apr.
9, 2001), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-09-
01a.html. Good lawyering is obviously a key to fair procedures. Indeed, it is careful
adherence to the formal procedures of criminal law that are fundamental to the oper-
ation of the entire system of criminal justice.
185 Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry I).
186 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that the jury had not been
properly instructed on mitigation and reversing the death sentence, but also holding
that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment to execute mentally retarded defend-
ants), overruled by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that it violates the
Eighth Amendment to execute mentally retarded inmates).
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sentencing.187 Thus, the case included issues of jury responsibility
not unrelated to Simmons, in that the arguments focused on
whether the jury had complete and accurate information.188
The standard the Court applied to Penry’s habeas petition
came from the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996.189 A federal court can only grant an application for a writ of
habeas corpus on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court if
that adjudication “‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Fed-
eral law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States.’”190 Even applying that high standard, the Court opinion,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, found that the jury instructions given at
Penry’s second sentencing hearing did not satisfy the requirements
of Penry I,191 and the state court’s conclusion that it did comply was
“objectively unreasonable.”192
Penry II reasserted the importance of mitigating evidence, a
theme that the Court had stressed in a long line of cases since Lock-
ett v. Ohio.193 Mental retardation, head injuries, childhood trauma,
drug and alcohol abuse all are very common in death penalty
cases.194 A clear message that defendants must be allowed to fully
187 Penry II, 532 U.S. at 796-804.
188 See id. at 796. “Penry also contends that the jury instructions given at his second
sentencing hearing did not comport with our holding in Penry I because they did not
provide the jury with a vehicle for expressing its reasoned moral response to the miti-
gating evidence of Penry’s mental retardation and childhood abuse.” Id.
189 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
190 See Penry II, 532 U.S. at 792 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
191 At Penry’s second sentencing, the jury had been given a supplemental instruc-
tion about mitigation, but the Court concluded the supplemental instruction could
be read in a way that did not allow the jurors to give full effect to Penry’s mitigating
evidence. Id. at 797-99. The Court concluded that even reading the instructions the
way the State urged was, at best, confusing. Id. at 798-99. The Court stated that assum-
ing that the jurors read the instruction the way the State contended, it still “made the
jury charge as a whole internally contradictory, and placed law-abiding jurors in an
impossible situation.” Id. at 799.
192 Id. at 804.
193 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that a sentencer must “not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s charac-
ter or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death.”) (emphasis in original).
194 See, e.g, Am. Bar Ass’n, American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 956 (2003) (stating,
“Neurological and psychiatric impairment, combined with a history of physical abuse
are common among persons convicted of violent offenses on death row”); Robert M.
Sanger, Comparison of the Illinois Commission Report on Capital Punishment with the Capital
Punishment System in California, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 101, 142-43 (2003) (noting
that “death row in California prisons is disproportionately populated by the poor, the
uneducated, those who had poor representation, the mentally ill, the developmen-
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present mitigating factors in a way that enables the jury to under-
stand and to act on them is essential to the defense in death pen-
alty cases.
Although Justice Ginsburg merely joined Penry II, and did not
write an opinion, her vote in the case is consistent with her voice
on the death penalty. Penry II—like Ring, Simmons, and Shafer—is
important because it reasserts the importance of the role of a fully
informed jury as the basic foundation of a fair capital sentencing
hearing.
Thirty years after Gregg v. Georgia, the quality of state criminal
procedure, even in death penalty cases, is still poor.195 Many state
appellate courts have become notoriously lax in death penalty
cases as the issue has been politicized, especially in the wake of the
electoral defeats of judges on death penalty issues.196 As some com-
mentators have observed, death penalty law embodies a “super due
process,” a heightened level of procedural due process because the
penalty is final.197 In her opinions and votes in cases like Penry II,
Justice Ginsburg has stood behind that ideal in the face of the
abandonment of this responsibility by states and an increasingly
conservative federal judiciary.198
tally disabled, . . . [and] those who suffered child abuse themselves”); Michael A.
Mello & Donna Duffy, Suspending Justice: The Unconstitutionality of the Proposed Six-Month
Time Limit on the Filing of Habeas Corpus Petitions by State Death Row Inmates, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. SOC. CHANGE 451, 483 (1991) (citations omitted) (stating that “a substantial
number of death row inmates suffer from mental illness”); Nancy Levit, Expediting
Death: Repressive Tolerance and Post-Conviction Due Process Jurisprudence in Capital Cases,
59 UMKC L. REV. 55, 80-81 (1990) (citations omitted) (noting that death row inmates
suffer disproportionately from illiteracy, mental illness, and mental retardation). See
generally DOROTHY OTNOW LEWIS, GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY: A PSYCHIATRIST EX-
PLORES THE MINDS OF KILLERS (1998) (discussing observations about brain damage,
abuse, and mental illness among the condemned).
195 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drinks,
Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425 (1996) [hereinafter Kirchmeier,
Drinks, Drugs, and Drowsiness].
196 Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 195 at 127-35.
197 Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980).
198 For example, even in Banks–in which seven Supreme Court justices found seri-
ous prosecutorial misconduct violating due process–both the Fifth Circuit and two
Supreme Court Justices, Justices Scalia and Thomas, found no reversible error in such
serious prosecutorial misconduct in a death penalty case. Banks v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct.
1256 (2004) (Thomas, J., with whom Scalia, J., joins concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see also Banks v. Dretke, 48 Fed. Appx. 104 (5th Cir. 2002).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In her death penalty opinions, Justice Ginsburg has been con-
sistently “scrupulous in applying law on the basis of legislation and
precedent,”199 as she predicted at her confirmation hearings, while
also exhibiting a fundamental concern with fairness in capital
cases. It is an approach that was embraced by Justice Blackmun for
almost two decades of deciding capital cases, until his frustration
led him to conclude that “even if the constitutional requirements
of consistency and fairness are theoretically reconcilable in the
context of capital punishment, it is clear that this Court is not pre-
pared to meet the challenge.”200
In Justice Ginsburg’s first eleven years on the Supreme Court,
she has not staked out a clear position in written death penalty
jurisprudence. She has written only three majority opinions, Ring,
Shafer, and Banks, all in safe seven-to-two majorities that included
many of the “moderate” or “conservative” justices. She honestly has
adhered to her strict judicial philosophy,201 but she also has joined
the other Justices to engage in what Justice Blackmun called
“tinker[ing]” with death.202 Thus, thirty years after Gregg, death
penalty jurisprudence is arguably stuck in the same place it was at
the time of Furman: juries, using the various “structured discretion”
199 Kuo & Wang, supra note 1, at 863 (quoting Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to
be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 103d Cong. 51, 53 (1993) (testimony of Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg).
200 Callins, 510 U.S. at 1156 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
201 At least one commentator has argued that Justice Ginsburg’s legal philosophy
also has been a restraining force on women’s rights issues:
Justice Ginsburg will not become the liberal, activist champion of wo-
men’s rights on the Supreme Court that Justice Marshall was for minor-
ity rights. The reason lies not in Justice Ginsburg’s lack of passion for
her cause; she is still lecturing and writing about her “grand ideal” that
one day men and women will be treated equally by the law. . . . Rather
the reason lies in her commitment to a particular judicial philosophy
that will prevent her from advocating great doctrinal changes except in
small steps; even if designed to advance women’s rights, her support of
women sexual harassment plaintiffs will come only when Supreme
Court precedent or her interpretation of legislative intent allows it.
Sheila M. Smith, Comment, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sexual Harassment Law: Will
the Second Female Supreme Court Justice Become the Court’s Women’s Rights Champion?, 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1893, 1945 (1995).
202 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Simi-
larly, it has been argued that “the Supreme Court’s project of constitutional regula-
tion of capital punishment since 1976 has played a role in legitimating and thus
stabilizing the practice of capital punishment, primarily by generating an appearance
of intensive judicial scrutiny and regulation despite its virtual absence.” Steiker, supra
note 112, at 1485.
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models are applying the death penalty almost as erratically as they
did pre-Furman.203
Justice Ginsburg’s death penalty majority decisions are more
important for what they do not say than for what they say. Al-
though she has signed onto opinions in cases where the death pen-
alty has been upheld, she has never written a majority opinion
upholding the death penalty. The lack of such a written opinion
may be a result of the choices of more conservative senior justices,
but it gives an indication that she is perhaps more likely than sev-
eral of her colleagues to conclude that the application of the death
penalty is unfair in an individual case.204
Justice Ginsburg has frequently written in dissent in death
penalty cases, and joined in other dissents, often with Justices Ste-
vens, Souter, Breyer or some combination of these justices.205
None of these justices has endorsed Justice Blackmun’s renuncia-
tion of the death penalty, but all have frequently voted to reverse
death penalty convictions, or dissented from the Court’s judgments
upholding convictions.
If a consistent theme emerges, it is Justice Ginsburg’s view that
death penalty judgments must be highly reliable and that death
penalty trials must represent a reasonable level of American justice.
Several of her cases taken together illustrate a faith that the most
likely way to reach reliable death sentences is through juries who
are given reliable information by competent defense attorneys and
honest prosecutors.
Justice Ginsburg has not taken a position against the death
penalty per se while a justice on the Supreme Court, but consider-
ing her dissenting opinions, she, more than several other justices,
has staked out the position that procedures must be fair and relia-
ble. She has followed the jurisprudence the Court developed be-
203 See, e.g., Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 35 at 360-459;
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Judicial Developments in Capital Punishment Law in
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT,
AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 55-83 (James R. Acker et al. eds.,
2003).
204 These cases run the gamut of death penalty and criminal justice issues; at the
most basic level, death penalty cases are just extraordinary criminal cases.
205 See, e.g., Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 118 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) (reasoning that after a state-mandated entry of a life sentence following a
jury deadlock, the double jeopardy clause prevents the imposition of the death pen-
alty at a new sentencing hearing); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 171 (1996) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting in an opinion joined by JJ. Stevens, Souter, and Breyer) (reasoning
that a habeas petitioner was denied the right to a full, fair, and effective opportunity
to defend himself at the penalty phase and that no new rule was implicated in his
habeas petition).
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tween Gregg and her arrival on the Court about the death penalty
being different from other punishments,206 but she has embraced
it more fiercely than have other members. Because Justice Gins-
burg arrived on the Court and faced her first death penalty deci-
sions as the United States death penalty “Moratorium Movement”
was developing,207 it is possible that revelations about the dangers
of executing the innocent, combined with her background, have
heightened her concern for added reliability in capital cases.
The problem with this faith in reliable death sentences is that
the quality of all criminal trials at the state level—and death pen-
alty trials in particular—is often poor. Even after Gregg and the
Warren Court’s revolution in criminal procedure, critics continue
to argue that the criminal justice system does a poor job in capital
cases.208 The criminal justice system is often inaccurate and arbi-
trary, and it magnifies the inequality based on class and race in our
society.209 Such problems are even more pronounced in capital
cases.210
Still, Justice Ginsburg’s careful approach toward capital cases
is consistent with her feminist jurisprudence and general concern
with the oppressed and powerless members of society. Historically,
women have played an important role in the battle against the use
of the death penalty, as well as against the use of the death pen-
alty’s cousin, lynching.211 Elizabeth Cady Stanton, a leader of the
women’s rights movement in the 1800s, once wrote, “As to the gal-
206 See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (“Because of that
qualitative difference [between prison and death], there is a corresponding differ-
ence in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case.”).
207 See, e.g., Kirchmeier, Moratorium, supra note 3, at 20-74.
208 See generally Bright, Counsel for the Poor, supra note 195; Kirchmeier, Drinks, Drugs,
and Drowsiness, supra note 195.
209 See generally David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Crimi-
nal Justice System (1999). “The vast majority of those behind bars are poor; 40 per-
cent of state prisoners can’t even read; and 67 percent of prison inmates did not have
full-time employment when they were arrested. The per capita incarceration rate
among blacks is seven times that among whites.” Id. at 4.
210 See id. at 88-92, 132-41. The Court “has stepped in to forestall the starkest inequi-
ties [regarding incompetent counsel], but its interventions have been more successful
in legitimizing the gaping inequities that remain than in providing anything ap-
proaching substantive equality for the poor.” Id. at 92.
211 “In the early 1900s . . . [t]he Association of Southern Women for the Prevention
of Lynching, directed by Jessie Daniel Ames, the Women’s International League for
Peace and Freedom, the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) and others
were key participants in the anti-lynching movement.” Kirchmeier, Moratorium, supra
note 3, at 95-96. See MARY JANE BROWN, ERADICATING THIS EVIL: WOMEN IN THE AMERI-
CAN ANTI-LYNCHING MOVEMENT 1892-1940 (2000).
272 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:241
lows, it is the torture of my life. . . . Woman knows the cost of life
better than man does.”212 Justice Ginsburg’s experience as a wo-
men’s rights advocate may continue to fuel a strong concern about
the use of the death penalty.
In many ways, modern death penalty jurisprudence, devel-
oped in the United States during the last thirty years, is still in its
infancy. During this short time, the pressures of life-and-death deci-
sions and the frustration with imperfect and inconsistent proce-
dures have forced several Justices, including Justice Scalia and
Justice Blackmun, to change the foundations of their death penalty
jurisprudence over time.213
Since Justice Ginsburg’s first term on the Court and Justice
Blackmun’s opinion in Callins, no Justice has made a radical reas-
sessment of her or his death penalty jurisprudence. Nonetheless,
some of the current Justices have exhibited a growing concern
about the process.214 In July 2001, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
stated that there are “serious questions” about whether the death
penalty is administered in a fair manner.215 In April of that year,
212 Women’s rights advocate Elizabeth Cady Stanton wrote eloquently about the
death penalty:
As to the gallows, it is the torture of my life. Every sentence and every
execution I hear of, is a break in the current of my life and thought for
days. I make my son the victim. I am with him in the solitude of that last
awful night, broken only by the sound of the hammer and the coarse
jeers of men, in preparation for the dismal pageant of the coming day. I
see the cold sweat of death upon his brow, and weigh the mountain of
sorrow that rests upon his soul, with its sad memories of the past and
the fearful forebodings of the world to come. I imagine the mortal ag-
ony, the death-struggle, and I know ten thousand mothers all over the
land weep, and pray, and groan with me over every soul thus lost. Wo-
man knows the cost of life better than man does. There will be no gal-
lows, no dungeons, no needless cruelty in solitude, when mothers make
the laws.
Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Marvin H. Bovee (Aug. 1, 1868) in VOICES
AGAINST DEATH 121, 121 (Philip English Mackey ed., 1976).
213 Despite upholding the importance of the consideration of mitigating factors in
his majority opinion in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987), Justice Scalia eventu-
ally rejected previous cases and took the position that the Eighth Amendment did not
require the consideration of mitigating factors and that a mandatory death penalty
would satisfy the Eighth Amendment. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. at 671-73. For a
further discussion of Justice Scalia’s reasoning regarding mitigating circumstances,
see Stephen G. Gey, Justice Scalia’s Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 96 (1992);
Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, supra note 35, at 447-51. As discussed
earlier, at the end of Justice Blackmun’s career, he concluded that the death penalty
was unconstitutional. See Callins, 510 U.S. at 1144-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
214 Additionally, several other federal and state judges have spoken out against the
death penalty. See Kirchmeier, Moratorium, supra note 3, at 30-36.
215 O’Connor Questions Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001, at A9. In a speech
before the Minnesota Women Lawyers Association, Justice O’Connor stated that there
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Justice Ginsburg said that she would be happy if Maryland passed a
moratorium on executions, asserting that “[p]eople who are well
represented at trial do not get the death penalty.”216 She also
noted, “I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming to
the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which
the defendant was well represented at trial.”217 It will be interesting
to watch Justice Ginsburg struggle with these problems, informed
by her own experiences and concern with injustice, while also try-
ing to scrupulously apply the law.
is a possibility that innocent people have been executed and that Minnesota residents
“must breath a big sigh of relief every day” because the state does not have a death
penalty. Id.
216 Gearan, supra note 10. In addition to the Supreme Court Justices, several fed-
eral and state court judges have expressed similar concerns with the fairness of the
death penalty. See Kirchmeier, Moratorium, supra note 3, at 31-36.
217 Justice Backs Death Penalty Freeze, CBSNews.com, Apr. 10, 2001, at http://www.cbs
news.com/stories/2001/04/10/deathpenalty/main284850.html (on file with the
New York City Law Review.

